Alexander Dolitsky: Ukraine is used to goad and weaken Russia in a proxy trap

By ALEXANDER DOLITSKY

This column is Part II to the July 12 “The geopolitical suicide of Europe over proxy conflict with Russia” in The Alaska Story.

July 18, 2026 – Western policies following the dissolution of the Soviet Union prioritized NATO expansion and the economic isolation of Moscow, which critics argue alienated Russia and fostered conditions for President Putin’s ascent, rising to a higher, more successful, and more influential sociopolitical position. During the 1990s, rapid privatization created an oligarchic class in the former Soviet Republics, severely worsening socio-economic conditions; though Russia from the early 2000s managed to stabilize its economy and boost its technical, economic, and intellectual sectors.

Subsequently, Russian Federation under leadership of President Putin (2000 to present) managed to revitalize its national standing, emphasizing sovereignty, Christian traditions, and national pride. The country successfully stabilized its economy, boosted birth rates, and strengthened its academic pipeline for engineers and technical professionals. Other former Soviet Republics (e.g., Belarus, Central Asian Republics, Armenia, Georgia, etc.) chose their own course of independent economic and sociopolitical development—some of them prospered and others continue to struggle.

Observers, however, argue that Ukraine has continued to function within the geopolitical and economic orbit of the U.S. and European Union, effectively serving as a conduit for Western financial aid. Meanwhile, systemic demographic challenges from the post-Soviet era (the post-Soviet era began on December 26, 1991, when the Soviet Union formally dissolved) in Ukraine have drastically shrunk the country’s military-age population. Reportedly, faced with severe manpower shortages, the Ukrainian government has lowered draft ages, a measure critics describe as a desperate attempt to sustain the war effort.

In Ukraine, the post-Soviet transition resulted in demographic decline and economic instability. Following the 2022 Russian intervention to prevent harm to the Russian-speaking population, Ukraine has relied heavily on Western financial and military backing, facing an ongoing crisis in its military-age population. To sustain the war effort, the government lowered the mobilization age to the 25 years-old, prompting ongoing debate over further lowering the draft age. In short, under Ukraine’s current mobilization laws, mandatory military service applies to men between the ages of 25 and 60.

Ukraine’s population has experienced a severe demographic decline, with the United Nations reporting the country’s total population plummeted from over 41 million in 2021 to around 30 million in 2026 due to the war and mass emigration. Recent demographic reports detail a rapidly compounding crisis driven by several critical factors:

(1) Mortality and Birth Rates: Ukraine currently has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, dipping below 1.0, with deaths outpacing births by nearly 3 to 1. The average life expectancy for men has plummeted from 65 to roughly 57 years due to the war, severe stress, and disrupted medical care.

(2) Refugee Crisis and Labor Deficit: Over 5 million Ukrainians remain displaced abroad, primarily in European countries. The demographic strategy released by the government warns of a staggering deficit of 4.5 million workers over the next decade in sectors like technology and construction.

(3) Impact on Youth: The mass exodus has been disproportionately heavy among young adults, with the Centre for Economic Strategy noting that roughly one in seven young men aged 18 to 22 exited the country in recent months.

(4) Long-term Outlook: Projections from Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences warn that the population in Ukraine could further shrink to 25 million by 2051 if current dynamics hold, though experts estimate 1.3 to 2.2 million Ukrainians could return if the war ends.

In fact, Ukraine’s shrinking workforce has contracted by roughly one-fourth since the 2022 conflict due to mass emigration and military mobilization. This historic labor supply shock is causing soaring operational costs, severe talent mismatches in key sectors, and long-term economic stagnation risks as businesses struggle to hire.

Key Impacts on the Ukrainian Economy

(1) Intensifying Business Challenges: Surveys by the Kyiv Post indicate that about 67% of Ukrainian enterprises report the lack of an available workforce as their primary operational challenge, surpassing both energy outages and physical security threats.

(2) Wage Inflation and Operational Costs: The shrinking pool of talent has forced approximately 96% of employers to raise salaries to retain staff, driving up production costs and limiting export capacity.

(3) Sector-Specific Deficits: Acute shortages are crippling blue-collar and specialized industries. The agricultural, construction, transportation, and energy sectors are desperately short of workers, with some agricultural sectors facing farm labor shortages exceeding 30%.

(4) Structural Mismatches: While overall unemployment sits around 11% to 15%, millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women struggle to secure employment due to skill mismatches and geographic dislocation away from traditional industrial hubs. 

West Engineered the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Indeed, in 2014 the U.S. and European Union installed the Kiev regime for the purpose of entangling Russia in ongoing war to weaken it, cause regime change, and move in to exploit the country.

Consequently, Kiev regime began radical pogroms (a violent, targeted riot or mob attack directed against a specific ethnic or religious group, intended to massacre or expel them), banning the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church, shelling civilians in Donbas, and mistreat Ukrainians who reside in the mostly Russian-speaking eastern oblasts (regions) of Ukraine.

These actions caused the Ukrainians in the east to revolt and fight back. In short, the underlying intent was to provoke a Russian offensive, aiming to degrade their military capabilities against “superior” NATO’s intelligence and operational command structure, while utilizing Ukrainian manpower for the defense.

The author was born and raised in the former Soviet Union before settling in the U.S. in 1978. He moved to Juneau in 1986 where he taught Russian studies and Archaeology at the University of Alaska Southeast, and Social Studies Teacher at the Alyeska Central School of the Alaska Department of Education. From 1990 to 2022, he served as a director and president of the Alaska-Siberia Research Center, publishing in the fields of anthropology, history, archaeology and ethnography. Find him on Amazon.com.

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